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ABSTRACT 
Grounded in collective interactions that are often quite contentious, knowledge is 
formulated in the world (objectified), and tangibly experienced (embodied) by the 
agents engaged in these interaction.  As means of acting on the world in order to 
transform it, knowledge is implicitly powerful.  Yet, the consequences of that power are 
only realized through the context in which they are carried out.  Thus, the ambiguous 
character of such knowledge must be evaluated by social agents in the course of their 
activities.  By drawing attention to these dimensions of knowledge as power which 
enable social agents to act on, and so tranform themselves as they transform the world, 
this essay broadly considers the implications the dialectics of  objectification and 
embodiment so ably detailed by Lambek,. 
 
keywords: objectification, embodiment, phenomenology, practice, power 
 
Introduction: Knowledge and Practice in Mayotte and Elsewhere 
 
Michael Lambek's remarkably rich ethnographic exegeses invite a parallel retelling of 
an encounter.  This encounter entailed a discussion concerned, as Lambek and other 
fundi's  are, with the conjunction of theoretical knowledge and the authority it 
commands in a concrete, pragmatic context.  One afternoon in the Haya village 
(Northwest Tanzania) where I was living and working, my housemate discovered that 
his nearly new hoe was missing.  He was quite certain he knew who had stolen the 
hoe, and was irately making accusations and garnering the moral backing and 
sympathy of our neighbors.  Should he summon the local police and have the suspect 
taken to the nearest court, or were these officials likely to demand exorbitant bribes 
without giving him any satisfaction?  He could attack the thief by force, but it was likely 
that the hoe was by now hidden away with distant kin, or had perhaps already been 
sold and resold several times.  One neighbor suggested that the matter might be taken 
to a ‘healer’ mganga who could perform what has been called ‘stick-divination’ in order 
to make known the whereabouts of both the suspected thief and the stolen hoe. 
According to this man, this divination technique involved the leaf and a twig of a certain 
variety of tree.  The healer would spit on the twig and quickly rub the spittle with the leaf 
along the length of the twig, all the while asking questions of the oracle: ‘Was so-and-so 
in the house?’ ‘Has “X” told the truth?’ ‘Did “Y” steal the hoe?’  The oracle revealed a 
true answer, our friend continued, when the leaf stuck fast in place, and could not be 
rubbed along the stick.  I was not the only one of those gathered who had never heard 
of such divinatory techniques (at least not in Buhaya).(1)  Many of those gathered 
objected that this practice made little sense.  ‘How could such a thing work? A stick?!’ 
To which our stick-divination advocate replied, ‘It's medicine!’ 
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 This explanatory theory, at once a truth claim and a claim to authorized, 
presumably incontrovertible knowledge, is a common-place in Haya discussions of the 
potency of material objects in their effects on the human world.  My neighbors and I 
may never have seen, or even heard of such a divinatory technique, but the claim that 
such techniques - and especially such material forms and substances - must work 
because they are ‘medicine’ (omubazi in Oluhaya, dawa in Kiswahili) was one that all of 
us were familiar with.  Such an assertion instantiates an understanding of power which 
seems simultaneously to rest on an extreme objectification of knowledge, and (perhaps 
consequently) a complete marginalization of human agency.  It is not the learning, skill, 
or reputation of the practitioner that carries the greatest claim to credibility and efficacy, 
rather it is the substance itself that is presented as the ‘final word’ in such matters.  But 
it is equally clear from the account just provided that medicine does not simply grow on 
trees; the unplucked twig and leaf have no significance- or perhaps remain only of 
significance in potentia- until they are concretely (and bodily) engaged by a diviner who 
pragmatically seeks a resolution to a client's predicament. 
 One of the many great strengths of Lambek's analysis and the theoretical terrain 
he opens up, is the way in which he draws our attention precisely to this persistent 
dialectic between objectification and embodiment.  And such insight is especially 
important for analysts of African cultural contexts like the Haya in which much of social 
experience and meaning is so often described in terms like ‘unconscious,’ ‘preverbal,’ 
or ‘corporeal.’   Lambek's  treatment of Arabic and especially Islamic texts as 
performative forms, at once embodied and objectified, can further be taken as a model 
that provides an essential corrective to long-standing, by now tedious debates about 
the contrast between orality and literacy.   There are communities, like the Haya, 
throughout Africa in which literacy and text-based systems of knowledge are of a 
relatively more recent introduction, and are less pervasive in their social effects than 
they are in Mayotte.   Scholars of colonialism in such contexts all too frequently 
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continue to draw the contrast between the written and the spoken in Manichean terms.  
But Lambek's work convincingly demonstrates that texts are appropriated in practices, 
and therefore have an intrinsically embodied dimension in the memorizations, 
recitations, and even inscriptions through which they come into being.(2)  The texts 
fundis  on Mayotte recite are no less ‘corporeal’ than the healing capacities enacted by 
Haya diviners are externalized in objective forms- they're ‘medicine.’  Thus, rather than 
asking whether a practice is ‘more or less’ objectified or embodied than another, it 
becomes necessary to ask how a given activity is realized as bodily experience and 
materialized form.  The value of Lambek's careful, rigorously grounded exposition of 
these issues, then, is the way it allows us to compare alternative modes of knowing  
and doing (even and especially within the same sociocultural context) in terms that are 
not graded along a relative - and perhaps teleological scale. 
 
 
Discourse, Debate, and Cultural Coherence 
 
Let me return to the scenario sketched above.  The viability of the diviner's practice is 
not only described, it is defended, and this dimension of practice is also illuminated in 
Lambek's study.  This discussion suggests that the Haya 'political economy of 
knowledge' might also be characterized as a repertoire of 'incommensurable 
discourses' each authorized and (re)producible by distinct methods.  Should we seek 
resolutions from the police, or from the diviner?  Whose methods are likely to bear fruit, 
whose are a sham? Which avenue is accessible, and to whom?  The contestation of 
these alternatives in which the claim to a certain kind of knowledge is made - ‘its 
“medicine!”’ - is not merely part of the context in which such practices must be 
understood, it is also an aspect of the character of that knowledge itself.  That is, the 
theoretical explanation - if not theory itself - offered for a particular form of action 
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emerges as a justification, an assertion of legitimacy in a field of diverse actions and 
skeptical actors.  Theory is an intrinsically pragmatic discourse, manifest in time and 
situated in social interaction.  
 The situated quality of this knowledge is of particular interest.  Lambek's work is 
notable for it attempt to integrate Schutzian sociology with speech act theory in an effort 
to get at the levels of interaction and the entailments of any particular ‘situation.’   
Accounts that explore the unevenness of this integration of levels and perspectives in 
social dynamics are, perhaps, a hallmark of post-modern ethnography.  Dissonance, 
cross-purposes, and manipulation are emphasized in the attempt to counter 
metanarratives of Culture, and the totalizing systematicity of Structure.  Lambek's 
interest and his ethnography are similarly concerned with the multiplicity of motives and 
the ‘open-endedness of debates,’ the ways in which all meanings, implicit or explicit, 
are provisional, all conclusions, inconclusive (Lambek 1993: 395ff).  Yet Lambek's 
discussion, from my perspective, does not reduce to a demonstration of polyphony (if 
not cacophony) for its own sake; this is no mere celebration of the anarchic collapse of 
'social solidarities' that never existed in the first place.  Instead, Lambek's focus on the 
pragmatics of sociality allow him rightly to insist on the on-going, emergent, and 
unstable qualities of collective life while simultaneously allowing for a significant degree 
of coherence  -and not uniformity - within the field of social interaction.  This is nowhere 
better illustrated, I think, than in his account of divergent views of sorcery, and the 
apparent skepticism which Lambek notes in Saidu Bwana, the fundi  of 'ilim fakihi 
whose knowledge- and character-  seem the most abstract and divorced from practical 
concerns.  Saidu refutes the significance of sairy , the packets of bodily exuviae that 
sorcerers insert into and mediums extract from the flesh of victims.  He insists that 
‘sairys are 'fictions' on the part of the fundis.  Anyone can make up a sairy; the fundis 
pretend to extract them because it brings them money’ (Lambek 1993: 281).  Such a 
claim is precisely the kind of 'voice' now oft-cited in anthropological accounts of 
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‘postmodern cultures’ as a domain of crude manipulation and self-interested calculation.  
Lambek, though, does his informants on Mayotte as well as his readers the distinct 
service of exploring the implications of this skepticism further.  Saidu Bwana is indeed 
skeptical of sairy  and the motives of mediums; but this skepticism is rooted in his fuller 
knowledge of the reality  of sorcery as a practice.  True sorcery, in Saidu's view, is 
carried out by the nefarious use of sacred texts.  Sorcery, as Lambek argues, can resist 
the hegemony of Islamic knowledge, and Islamic hegemony can reassert its authority 
over all practice.  The same is true for the skeptics who challenged the validity of stick-
divination.  Some hold that such techniques are medicine and highly effective, while 
others doubt the legitimacy of this practice.  But what is never at issue is the truth that 
medicines are extraordinary powerful substances.(3)  The Haya conflict turns on 
whether divination is dawa, not on whether dawa ‘really’ works. The larger point of 
Lambek's position is that such fundamental discrepancies and disjunctures depend 
upon a point of convergence -the reality of sorcery, or medicine- around which debates 
and multiplying  perspectives can be generated.  The polyvocality of cultural knowledge 
and practice, in other words, is implicated in a coherent process.  Perspectives may be 
partial, fragmentary, incompatible, and uncertain, but all that contention need not 
dissolve the reality of the world in question.  Indeed, I would argue, the coherence of 
these debates may well solidify the reality of the real. 
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The Ambiguities of Power 
 
If knowledge of the world can never be separated from knowledge in the world - that is, 
if theory always implies practice - then knowledge is always realized as a form of 
power.  By 'power' I mean not only the ways in which certain forms and understandings 
of knowledge are reproduced through a specific structure of authority, restricted to 
specific categories of social actors, or even that knowledge as knowledge in the world 
may serve to enhance or undermine those authorized positions.  Lambek's use of 
speech act theory as a means of assessing the social consequence of knowledge and 
knowing emphasizes the fact that knowledge is power not just because it has 
ideological effects (a claim widely made in many contemporary analyses that rarely 
amounts to more than an appeal to functionalist instrumentalism), but because 
knowledge is a capacity to do things.  This power to effectively enact, a potential to 
bring forth and transform, makes the men and women of Mayotte who participate in the 
varieties of knowledge Lambek describes highly inventive, creative, and resourceful.  At 
the same time, if knowledge is always wedded to a specific field of interactions, then 
the potency of knowing must also be recognized as threatening, subversive, and 
potentially dangerous.  If knowledge is a way of doing, it may also serve to undo. 
 This inherent ambiguity apparent in the power of knowledge is, again, clearly 
illustrated  in Lambek's discussion of sorcery.  Sorcery in Mayotte is  (colloquially) 
‘knowledge,’ 'ilim, a fact which underscores the subversive potential in all ways of 
knowing (Lambek 1993: 241).  Sorcery is not a separate domain of knowledge, a 
discipline unto itself, but a concrete position with respect to knowing practices 
themselves.  Thus, Islam and spirit possession can each lay claim to the validity of 
divergent etiologies and therapeutic techniques for addressing sorcery from within the 
frameworks of their divergent - if overlapping - perspectives.  This recognition of the 
intrinsic links between knowledge as transformative power, and its consequent 
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ambiguity as both a creative and a subversive potential is further evidenced by the 
Haya conversation described.  A Haya aphorism states Omutambi nomurogi, ‘The 
healer is a sorcerer,’ and this clear insistence that knowledge is bound to particular 
social purposes and thus inherently open to multiple, even conflicting enactments, is 
further objectified in the material form of such knowledge, namely, ‘medicine.’  In the 
encounter described, the efficacy  and truth of divination is defended as medicine, but it 
is far more common in everyday gossip and conversation to hear 'medicine' used as a 
shorthand for sorcery.  The wealthy man who has fallen low, the women who suffers a 
series of miscarriages, the chronic pains an otherwise vigorous youngster complains of, 
all of these provide an occasion for neighbors to knowingly comment ‘it must be 
medicine.’  Like ‘knowledge’ in Mayotte, ‘medicine’ in Buhaya is highly transformative, 
condensed, substantial power.  That condensation gives medicine its efficacy, but it 
also allows for a degree of deception.  Condensed power can be readily hidden from 
general knowledge, which may be designed to protect the patient from their predators, 
or allow the healer to control access to their expertise - but it may equally permit illicit 
actions to be concealed.  Again, the efficacy of medicine is a potential to effect a 
concrete field of interactions, and so medicine is emblematic of positive and negative 
interventions - and of the all too frequent difficulty of distinguishing one from the other. 
 
 
The Moral Force of Performance 
 
‘Knowledge’ on Mayotte, like ‘medicine’ in Buhaya, is both sorcery, and the means to 
control it.  These deliberate dualities emphasize the performative character of these 
discourses, their inescapable ties to the contexts in which they are put into practice.  
Such ambivalences demonstrate how necessary it is to appreciate the specifics of 
context in order to evaluate the implications and the consequences of these discourses.  
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Given these not only potential, but necessary ambivalences, in the character of these 
discourse, and especially the extraordinary consequences for of the kinds of power to 
harm or to cure they make manifest, it is clear that social beings must be able to make 
judgments  in order to distinguish appropriate from inappropriate acts, ensorcelling from 
healing ‘medical knowledge’ (to draw a not too farfetched connection).  That is, the 
embedding of ways of knowing in social action itself clearly connects informed practice 
to morality. 
 Lambek has characterized all of the the discourses on Mayotte as forms of 
‘practical morality,’ phronesis as it has been taken up by hermeneutics.  In Knowledge 
and Practice in Mayotte, this use of phronesis serves, I would argue two purposes.  
One the one hand, as Lambek argues in his overview, ‘[Phronesis] is precisely distinct 
from abstract, or universal knowledge and hence from purely objectified textual 
knowledge, in that it addresses change rather than constancy.’  Again, moral judgment 
is an imminently practical matter, and not the mere application of an abstract code.  
Lambek also employs the notion of phronesis in order to distinguish moral awareness 
from techne, an instrumental knowledge of how to do things, of pragmatic, embodied 
techniques, as the etymology implies.  In his overview Lambek claims that he might 
have drawn this distinction between practical morality and pragmatic technique, 
phronesis and techne, more clearly, but I think the implicit practice of his work (if not the 
explicit theorizing) make this distinction clear enough.  In particular, Lambek's use of 
speech act theory to work towards a more general theory of ritual action depends upon 
a similar kind of division in the effects of performance.  In Austin's terms, the locutionary 
acts of a statement inhere in the expression of the utterance.  They allow that utterance 
to be evaluated as both grammatically correct and semantically well formed.  
Locutionary acts, then, are like embodied techniques; they can be evaluated against 
the conditions of their performance as relatively well or poorly executed.   Just as one 
can be a poor swimmer, so one can have poor command of Spanish grammar, or make 
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inaccurate statements.  The moral effects of ritual actions, Lambek - following 
Rappaport - tells us are equally performed, but cannot be evaluated according to the 
same criteria as the efficacy of technical acts.   As Lambek says, ‘Rendering a 
statement performative does not bring about material results, but it does entail moral 
ones,’ (Lambek 1993: 109).  A ritual act, then, is not well or poorly done, but its effects 
are demonstrated by the moral condition assumed by the agent- just as making a 
promise cannot be judged true or false, but the promise is demonstrated by being kept.  
Prayer, sacrifice, and possession in Mayotte similarly entail conventional acts that have 
profound moral implications for those who carry them out.  The illocutionary effects of 
ritual performance are the moral force of these acts.  Thus, phronesis might be 
distinguished from techne as illocutionary forces are distinguishable from (some) 
locutionary acts. 
 
 
Objects and Bodies Reconsidered 
 
I have tried to trace a continuous thread that runs through the broader pattern of 
Lambek's presentation.  This singular thread is spun out of a profound concern with 
how knowledge is situated.  Grounded in collective interactions that are often quite 
contentious, knowledge is formulated in the world (objectified), and tangibly 
experienced (embodied) by the agents engaged in these interaction.  As means of 
acting on the world in order to transform it, knowledge is implicitly powerful. Yet, the 
consequences of that power are only realized through the context in which they are 
carried out. Thus, the ambiguous character of such knowledge must be evaluated by 
social agents in the course of their activities.  The power implicit in knowledge, 
therefore, makes its proper exercise a moral concern, for healers and their patients, for 
fundi and their clients, for ‘performers’ and their ‘audiences.’  These issues take us to 
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the heart, I feel, of Lambek's arguments,  and I hope it is clear that they have important 
implications for ethnographic description, anthropological analysis, and social theory 
more generally. 
 One critical contribution of Lambek's work, at least for those of us working 
towards developing phenomenological perspectives on collective lived experience, is 
his demonstration of the ways in which what might appear to be over-arching, 
institutionalized structures of social life- institutions like ‘Islam’ and ‘literacy,’ but also 
‘kinship’ and ‘possession,’  are motivated from within complex fields of interaction, and 
are never simply imposed upon it.  Schutz's description of this complexity in terms of 
the shifting and developing perspectives of differently motivated social beings, each 
with distinct degrees of interest and experience in the action at hand, goes a long way 
towards helping us understand how apparently overwhelming structural forces are 
themselves highly dependent on their realization in social practices occurring in time 
and space.  These forces do not (in any simple way) deterministically constrain activity, 
rather they are of it.  
 It is in the active interpenetration of these emerging and evolving perspectives 
that knowledge is constituted.  Ways of knowing in Lambek's work are configured in 
these pragmatic contexts.  But I think it might be useful, as well, to consider the terms 
of this process from yet another perspective and ask how it is that practice is shaped, 
and with what consequence.  In Lambek's analyses his principle concern is to reveal 
the performative character of knowledge, to show that asking what knowledge on 
Mayotte is is indivisible from asking how this knowledge comes into being - how it is 
produced and reproduced.  The complementary perspective I propose would ask not 
only what constitutes knowledge on Mayotte, but what does knowledge on Mayotte do; 
not only what makes practice on Mayotte well formed, but what makes it effective.   This 
perspective, I think, may indicate some possible absences in Lambek's account, 
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absences which can only lead to an expansion of the open spaces within the shared 
horizons inspired by this work. 
 Let me make it clear, first of all, that by asking what knowing practice does in 
Mayotte I do not mean to propose a functionalist framework.  I am quite in sympathy 
with Lambek's contention that practice theory has too frequently been adopted as a 
means of focusing on strategizing, self-seeking, individualistic social actors.  But I would 
also suggest that while meaning is not simply a convenient tool for covering over 
ulterior motives- i.e., that meaning is never merely an ideological effect - the meaning of 
practice is formulated in relation to the kinds of purposes  that practice is intended to 
achieve.  Practice, that is, can also be understood from a phenomenological 
perspective that explores the ways in which social agents construct themselves  as they 
constitute the world in which they act.  To a degree Lambek has addressed this aspect 
of practice in Mayotte in his assessment of the performative dimensions of ritual.  His 
discussion of the illocutionary effects of prayer, supplication, as well as sorcery, shows 
that practitioners demonstrate their will and so concretize their moral condition as a 
dimension of their own identity.  But, at the same time, Lambek asserts - in keeping with 
Austin's and Rappaport's theories of performance - that these transformations are 
strictly moral in nature. ‘[W]hat the invocation of sorcery or antambu establishes,’ for 
example, ‘is less efficient cause or instrument per se  than social accountability’ 
(Lambek 1993: 389), while - even more forcefully- sorcery's ‘primary consequences are 
moral rather than material . . . In the end the diversity of means ascribed to the sorcerer 
is irrelevant [emphasis added].  In his act the sorcerer does not and cannot cause 
significant events, but he assumes moral responsibility for them’ (Lambek 1993: 262). 
 My concern with assertions like these is that they seem to rest on a fundamental 
distinction between ‘instrumental’ and’expressive’ practices, as though they were 
distinct kinds of action.  An insistence on such a distinction would seem to undermine 
one of the principle claims of practice theory, namely that effective, instrumental action 
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presumes a meaningfully constituted order of relations in which such action can be  
understood and evaluated.  The instrumental is expressive, just as the expressive is 
constituted by instrumental (i.e., productive) acts.  Again, I think Lambek is quite right to 
draw our attention to phronesis  as a dimension of practice that has been overlooked to 
the benefit of the political.  But it is equally important that we not sever the connections 
between power (by which I mean much more than politics) and morality.  We can, and 
should consider ethical know-how as a dimension of know-how more generally,  
phronesis, that is, as a dimension of techne.  For while it is surely the case that simply 
knowing how to perform one's prayers is not sufficient to ensure one's piety, it seems 
equally clear from Lambek's persuasive ethnography, that piety cannot be achieved in 
absence of the proper techniques of performance. 
 The phenomenological dimension of practice that I think might be more 
concretely addressed, then, might be simplistically summarized as ‘the world.’  
Lambek's work emphasizes the performative effects of action on the performer - 
demonstrates how conventionalized practices constitute the character of their agent.  
But this leaves open the question of the specific means by which these acts are carried 
out, and the world in which they are made sense of as effective.  What are the 
meanings of the specific material forms in and through which performance is made both 
persuasive and powerful?  To get at these complex issues, it might be useful to 
reexamine the dialectics of objectification and embodiment as Lambek has described 
them in a few critical cases.   
 Consider, for example, the significance of swadaka, the sacrifice, or offerings 
that accompany prayers (Lambek 1993: 108-9).  Lambek notes that the offering of 
swadaka creates a tangible model of the supplicants intentions, and of their 
supplication.  Its offering objectifies the dependence of the supplicant, and so 
acknowledges the power of the the entity to whom the swadaka is given; in this way the 
power of theswadaka might be characterized in terms of the dialectic of passion and 
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action Lambek - following Lienhardt - uses to decribe possession.  All of these 
exegeses of swadaka ring true, but they also raise a number of questions.  Just how is 
it that an object - even, perhaps especially, ‘worthless’ ones like tree leaves - is able to 
concretize supplication?  Why is an offering not an expression of the superiority of the 
giver viz the recipient, as is certainly the case with any number of offerings in other 
contexts?  And if, as Lambek has convincingly demonstrated, words are also objects, 
substantive forms with concrete qualities of sound and tone and cadence, then we need 
to know why swadaka are required as an additional objectification.  And in particular we 
need to know why these objects; why the particular forms suited to the particular 
purposes of supplication.  If swadaka is supposed to ‘clear the channels’ (Lambek 
1993: 108), then we need to know precisely how this is accomplished.  Lambek argues 
that objects beyond prayers help to transform words into rituals.  The conventional act 
of swadaka has illocutionary force.  But in order to demonstrate that force we need to 
understand how objects are engaged in exchange practices outside of these ritual 
contexts, to grasp the sense of how meaning becomes embedded in objects that 
makes swadaka appropriate vehicles for ‘clearing the channels.’  I don't doubt that 
offerings objectify intentions - but how this is so is always a culturally and historically 
specific question, and not a generic feature of ‘the gift.’ 
 We might ask similar questions about sairy, the packets of sorcery subtance 
extracted by healers, that might be seen as inversions of swadaka offerings.  Lambek's 
discussion of extraction is a tour de force analysis of performance, and its implications 
both for the client and, crucially, the healer.  But a dimension of that peruasive 
performance itself that demands more attention is the sairy itself.  Of course, outside of 
the performative context of extraction, the sairy has no significance.  As Tumbu himself 
argues, curing sorcery is based not on the objective origins of the sairy, but the 
subjective experience of its extraction.  Nonetheless, the fact remains that the 
subjective experience configured in the effective performance of extraction is focused 
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on the sairy .  What accounts for the effectiveness of this object?  Why are spirits 
attracted to these objects and enlisted to attack the sorcerer's victim through this 
offering?  What gives these objects the capacity for penetration and transformation?  To 
argue that they provide a means of concretizing a sorcerer's intention, and so assuming 
the moral responsibility for future affliction is to focus primarily on the subjective 
dimensions of this process.  But if sairy implantations and extractions are conventional 
acts, and so possessed of illocutionary force, then the question of why these particular 
objects remains critical. 
 We might also ask, turning fom objectification to embodiment, what kinds of 
bodies are susceptible to sairy implantation, and what bodies feel relief at their 
extraction.  How are these specific bodily experiences formulated in social practice on 
Mayotte?  Consider, again, the use of singa and other inscribed amulets as healing 
practices.  Texts are always embodied, through recitation, memorization, or speech 
itself, yet drinking the erased inscription of a Qur'anic verse would seem more - or 
differently - potent than these other forms of embodiment.  Understanding the particular 
bodily dimensions of such practices is critical, especially as they are so pervasive in any 
number of African contexts.  What are the specfic bodily qualities generated, or invoked 
by this healing practice?  From the perspective of bodiliness, how does swallowing 
differ from speaking?  In all of the discourses he discusses, Lambek clearly 
demonstrates that these forms of knowledge entail embodied experiences as well as 
objectified codes.  Muslim fundis recite ‘eternal’ texts, cosmologers count out the ‘fixed’ 
position of the stars on their fingers, sorcerers conventionally dance on graves, spirit 
mediums enter trance in highly routinized performances.  To push Lambek's analyses a 
bit further, though, we might ask how the dialectics of objectification and embodiment 
are distinctively configured in each of these discourses.  Saidu Bwana's knowledge is 
no less embodied than is Tumbu's, but it clearly is embodied differently.  How are 
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recitiation, dance, and trance appropriate as bodily experience to their respective 
discourses? 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Lambek has expressed a reluctance discuss ‘the body tout court,’ and the perspective I 
am encouraging here is equally hesitant to address such issues.  But I would not 
identify that (essentializing) impulse with Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology.  For 
Merleau-Ponty the significance of ‘the body’ is not as an independent entity capable of 
‘authentic’ experience.  Rather, he describes bodiliness (and never simply the form or 
structure of the body itself) as a the medium through which we encounter our tasks at 
hand.  The body, in other words, is nothing less than being-in-the-world, a perspective 
from which objects - including the body itself - come to aquire their significance through 
our bodily engagement with them.  Such a perspective, I would (and have in many 
places) suggested is quite compatible with precisely the kind of practice orientation that 
Lambek has so successfully developed in his treatment of discourse on Mayotte.  
 I must say that I hate reviewers who address their criticisms to what is not in a 
work rather than to what is.  The point of my suggestions is not to ask ‘What about 
exchange?  What about disease? What about mortuary?’  Knowledge and Practice in 
Mayotte is already a sufficiently large book, and cannot be faulted for what some 
readers might like to see it address.  Rather, my comments are offered in the spirit of 
the book itself, and are intended to enrich the terms of the argument, and the goals that 
Lambek sets for himself.  At the very least, it is refreshing to me to find that interpretive 
and phenomenological appproaches in anthropology are capable of such rich and 
insightful understandings of social, and not simply personal, experience.  If I want to 
suggest that Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology might complement those of Schutz and 
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Gadamer so ably deployed by Lambek, this can be understood as part of an attempt to 
open more spaces within the shared horizons of these orientations.  Knowledge and 
Practice in Mayotte  is a powerful model, a singular example not only of how 
ethnographic description can be tied to theoretical acumen, but how theoretical clarity is 
ineluctably linked to sociocultural practice.  In this sense, Lambek has not only 
expanded our knowledge, he has given us some good medicine! 
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1 Nor was I ever able to observe this technique. 
 
2Lambek writes specifically about singa inscriptions and related written amulets as powerful 
"textualization[s], hence sanctification[s] of the body," (142) but I would add that all forms of 
writing (and reading- or, perhaps, "visualizing" for if verses can be recited without their linguistic 
content being intelligible, than surely they can be seen and admired for reasons beyond their 
semantic content) are necessarily realized through the medium of the body.  Somebody must 
write, and does so in ways that are constrained and enabled by specific contexts of meaning. 
 
3This was so even for Haya who were trained as physician's assistant and laboratory technicians, 
many of whom told me some of the most vivid accounts of the nefarious  and protective uses of 
dawa. 
